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Constitutional Law-PUBLIC PERIL AND PRIVATE PROPERTY IN
THE TAKINGS CLAUSE-State v. Mid-Florida Growers, Inc., 505 So.

2d 592 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)

T

HE FIFTH amendment of the United States Constitution

provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law and that no private property

may be taken for public use without just compensation. This "takings clause" 1 applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.2 The broad and deceptively simple concepts of "taking," "property," and "just
compensation" are not simplistic in their application. Judicial takings clause analysis has created a morass of muddled rules, ad hoc
decisions and contradictory holdings'
The courts and commentators have variously construed due process,' takings,5 property,' and just compensation 7 as the most essential criterion for deciding whether a specific case requires compensation. Yet all of these criteria fail to provide the courts with
sufficient guidance for their decisions. Perhaps the most prevalent
judicial doctrine of the takings clause is that standards are simply
abandoned and each case is decided on its facts.'
Where a government exercises its power of eminent domain to
acquire a fee simple estate, the takings clause requires the payment of just compensation.9 Also, where government action affects
property through tortious conduct e or regulation, 1 the property
owner may bring an "inverse condemnation" action against the
1. The term "takings clause" is used in this Note to describe that body of law and analysis which attempts to determine in what instances a government must compensate individuals for property deprivation in order to comport with the fifth and fourteenth amendments
of the Constitution, where that government did not invoke the power of eminent domain
prior to the deprivation.
2. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
623, 669 (1887).
3. See generally Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical
Foundation of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1169-70 (1967); Rose,
Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 566
(1984); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964); Stoebuck, Police
Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1057, 1058 (1980).
4. Comment, BalancingPrivate Loss Against Public Gain to Test for a Violation of Due
Process or a Taking Without Just Compensation, 54 WASH. L. REv. 315 (1979).
5. E.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 267 (1946).
6. E.g., Mugler, 123 U.S. at 665.
7. E.g., Michelman, supra note 3.
8. E.g., Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
9. Sax, supra note 3, at 38.
10. Causby, 328 U.S. at 267.
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1 3
government. 2 However, the valid exercise of the "police powerM
precludes the payment of compensation even though an individual's interest is destroyed." '
Florida's Second District Court of Appeal considered a controversy set squarely in the grayest portion of this "parody of stare
decisis" 1 in State v. Mid-Florida Growers, Inc."8 The appellees in
Mid-Florida Growers operated citrus nurseries and obtained
budwood from another nursery which was later discovered to be
infected with citrus canker. Although the samples tested from appellees' nursery revealed no citrus canker infection, 281,474 of the
17
appellees' healthy but "suspect" citrus plants were destroyed.
The Second District Court of Appeal recognized the difficulty of
distinguishing between the valid exercise of the police power and
an "impermissible encroachment on private property rights" requiring compensation. 8 The court held that, while the state's response to the possibility of citrus canker infection by the destruction of healthy but suspect trees was a valid exercise of the police
power, the destruction still effected a taking requiring compensation. Because the issue was so significant, however, the following
question was certified to the Florida Supreme Court: "Whether the
State, pursuant to its police power, has the constitutional authority
to destroy healthy but suspect citrus plants without
compensation?' 9

11. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378
(1987).
12. Id. at 2386-87.
13. The term "police power" itself escapes definition. Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging
by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(1971).
14. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 658 (1887).
15. Rose, supra note 3, at 566.
16. 505 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
17. Id. at 593. Section 581.181, Florida Statutes, provides that the director of the Division of Plant Industry may cause the destruction of any plant or plant product infested or
infected with plant pests and no damages shall be awarded. Florida law further grants to the
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services the power to destroy:
articles capable of harboring plant pests . . .if they are infested or located in an
area which may be suspected of being infested or infected due to its proximity to a
known infestation, or if they came from a situation where they were reasonably
exposed to infestation, when necessary to prevent or control the dissemination of
plant pests or noxious weeds or to eradicate same and to make rules therefor.
FLA. STAT.

18.
19.

§ 581.031(17) (1985).

Mid-Florida Growers, 505 So. 2d at 594.
Id. at 596.
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In this Note, the author explores takings law by examining, in
detail, the United States Supreme Court's three most recent takings clause decisions to provide a basic conceptual background for
takings clause analysis. The author then considers the specific issues that confronted the Second District Court of Appeal in MidFlorida Growers and evaluates the court's disposition of those
issues.
I.

RECENT TAKINGS DECISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT

The United States Supreme Court recently added greatly to the
volume of takings clause jurisprudence, if not to its clarity, by
handing down three decisions directly related to land use regulation. The principles enunciated by these cases, and the contradictions evident within them, expose the fundamental issues of private interest and government power, and the constraints imposed
on them by takings clause jurisprudence.
The first decision considered facts which were essentially analogous to those of the famous decision of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon."° In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,1 the Court considered state legislation prohibiting mining that
causes subsidence damage to public buildings and noncommercial
buildings generally used by the public, dwellings used for human
habitation, and cemeteries.2 2 The complaint alleged that this legislation worked a constitutionally prohibited taking of the "support
estate" which Pennsylvania recognizes as a separate estate in
23
land.
The legislation considered in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
also protected dwellings from subsidence caused by coal mining.
The complaint was from the owner of a dwelling.2 4 Justice Holmes'
opinion maintained that the protection of a single private home
could not state a sufficient public interest to justify an invocation
of the police power which abolished "a very valuable estate."2 5 Be20. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
21. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406.4 (Purdon 1987).
23. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. at 1238. Coal producers typically retained the mineral estate and the support estate while acquiring a waiver of liability for
damages on the surface caused by coal mining. Id. at 1238-39. Justice Holmes concluded
that this same property right represented "an estate in land." Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414.
24. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412-13.
25. Id. at 414.
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cause the complaint demanded the protection of a single dwelling,
Justice Holmes found no public nuisance.
Justice Holmes also discussed the validity of the statute on its
face. The Court held that the legislation could not be sustained as
an exercise of the police power without payment of just compensation. The regulation "went too far" since "a strong public desire to
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving
the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying
for the change. '2 6 Since the legislation diminished the value of the
property "too far," an impermissible taking had occurred."
The Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association purported
to distinguish Mahon.28 Justice Stevens maintained that the public
purpose which was found lacking in Mahon was present in the contemporary legislation and that it did not present undue interference with "investment-backed expectations." 9 But the analysis
and conclusion of Keystone Bituminous Coal Association obviously diverge from the Mahon decision.
Justice Stevens' characterization of the Mahon test indicates a
limitation of the constitutional restraints on government power.
"We have held that land use regulation can effect a taking if it
'does not substantially advance legitimate state interests . . . or
denies an owner economically viable use of his land.' 30 The first
half of the Mahon test is the basic due process analysis of government action.3 1 The due process emphasis of Keystone Bituminous
Coal Association focuses on the legitimacy of the government purpose and the effectiveness of the regulation in advancing that purpose. Thus, Justice Stevens' test shifts away from the private interest analysis of Mahon to an analysis of the legitimacy of the
government action. 2
26. Id. at 415-16.
27. Id. at 414-15.
28. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1240 ("The similarities are far less significant than the differences.").
29. Id. at 1241.
30. Id. at 1242 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
31. However, requiring the regulation to "substantially advance" state interests implies a
higher level of scrutiny. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3150
(1987) ("[Olur cases describe the condition for abridgement of property rights through the
police power as a 'substantial advanc[ing]' of a legitimate State interest." (emphasis in
original)).
32. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. at 1244 ("'[Prohibition simply upon
the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the
health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot in any just sense, be deemed a taking or
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While the Keystone Court attempted to reconcile Mahon, Keystone's due process analysis contrasts that of the Mahon holding.
Relying upon Mugler v. Kansas, the Keystone Bituminous Coal
Association decision appeared to grant wide deference to legislative bodies in their decisions defining property uses as noxious or
harmful. 3 The Mahon holding implied that such legislation could
be characterized as forcing a property owner to relinquish his
property interests to confer a public benefit rather than to prevent
a public harm. This semantic contrast between regulation as forcing owners to bear the expense of a public benefit and preventing
them from inflicting a public harm is at the center of the takings
clause conflict.3 4 The first prong of the Keystone Bituminous Coal
Association due process test leaves authority for making the "benefit-harm" distinction with the political branch while reserving the
judiciary only due process oversight. This diminution of the judiciary's role in police power takings analysis represents a conscious
' 35
choice to abandon the standardless rule of "too-far.
The second prong of Keystone Bituminous Coal Association also
worked to limit the authority of the judiciary to force inverse condemnation. This prong addressed the extent to which a property
owner's interest might be diminished by government action before
the action becomes a taking requiring compensation." In other
words, the Court attempted to define the level at which an
abridgement of a property interest becomes constitutionally
37
significant.
A court can manipulate an evaluation of the extent to which
property rights have been infringed based upon the court's definiappropriation of property.'") (quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)). The state
thus need not compensate for losses caused by a prevention of a "noxious use" of property.
33. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
34. Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 1069. Professor Stoebuck argues that Mahon and Mugler
represent the only basic contending judicial doctrines. Scholars generally recognize that attempting to distinguish between regulation which forces a public benefit and one which
prevents a public harm is the source of much of the difficulty in takings clause analysis. See
Michelman, supra note 3, at 1201-02.
35. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. at 1245 ("Under our system of government, one of the state's primary ways of preserving the public weal is restricting the uses
individuals can make of their property. While each of us is burdened somewhat by such
restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others.").
36. The second prong does not apply directly to the facts of Mid-FloridaGrowers since,
in that case, the owner's interest was completely destroyed. However, it illustrates the direction of the Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n decision and, along with two recent decisions,
demonstrates the fracture in Supreme Court analysis under the takings clause.
37. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. at 1247.
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If the consideration is

only of the interest affected by the regulation, then the property
owner's loss is total. 39 But if the owner's total property interest

includes valuable interests besides those affected by the regulation,
the deprivation is diminished as a proportion of the total property
interest.4 °
The Court's analysis under this second test in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association utilized the total interest measurement
rather than considering only the interest affected by the regulation.41 The Court rejected both the contention that the loss of the
coal left in the ground and the elimination of the support estate
approached constitutional significance. Instead, the Court held
that in the context of the owner's entire "bundle" of property
rights, the loss of "individual strands" could not amount to a taking requiring compensation."2 While the Court provided no firm
guidelines for the determination of takings questions, the analysis
under the second test further reduced the judicial role in evaluating police power regulations under the taking clause. Since the
Court expanded the scope of "property," marginal diminution in
value would seem to become judicially unreviewable.
Justice Stevens' reliance upon Mugler v. Kansas is particularly
demonstrative of the Court's disapproval of Mahon in Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association.'3 Where Mahon allowed subjective
judicial analysis guided only by undefinable notions of "too far,"
Mugler would defer to legislative decisions. Where Mahon suggested scrutiny of the harm inflicted upon an individual by regulation, Mugler focused upon the benefit accruing to society from the
regulation. Thus under Mugler v. Kansas and Keystone Bituminous Coal Association, only where an individual's harm could not
be justified within the due process analysis of the benefit provided
38. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-15 (1922). Justice Holmes'
opinion emphasizes that the legislation worked a deprivation of "certain coal" which the
mining company was forced to leave in the ground. Justice Holmes' view implies that the
loss of this interest represented a total property deprivation. The opinion also treats the
"support estate" as a total and indivisible property interest. See Rose, supra note 3, at 56667.
39. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130
(1978) (takings analysis "does not divide a single parcel into discrete units and attempt to
determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated").
40. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. at 1246-51.
41. Id. at 1249.
42. Id. at 1244-45.
43. Id. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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by regulation could the judiciary invoke takings clause protection
for individual property rights.""
The law of takings and compensation appeared to be settling
into a more coherent order. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association seemed to impose restraint upon the judiciary and to defer to
legislative choices. The Court limited its role by emphasizing the
importance of public purposes in regulatory property interest infringement. By expanding the concept of property, the constitutional prohibition against takings was substantially truncated.
The law of the takings clause, however, began a renewed plunge
into the depths of the morass barely two months after the decision
of Keystone Bituminous Coal Association. The first of these decisions"' assaulted the property expansion concept of Keystone Bituminous Coal Association and the second 4 attacked the notion of
deference toward public purpose justification. These cases appear
to reverse Keystone Bituminous Coal Association; however, the
distinguishing language of both cases merely preserves the parody
of stare decisis which has become the benchmark of takings clause
decisions.
The Court in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church held
that "where the government's activities have already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government
can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period
during which the taking was effective."4' 7 Despite the two-monthold decision of Keystone Bituminous Coal Association, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion relied on Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon. The opinion rejects the notion of diminished prohibitions under the takings clause, asserting that the deprivation which
may occur between the imposition of an infringing regulation and a
subsequent judicial evaluation of the regulation and purported
deprivation attains constitutional significance. The assertion that
"temporary" takings "are not different in kind from permanent
takings" reflects a narrowing of the "property" concept which limits the analysis to the interest affected rather than to the owner's
total interest. Thus, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis, the
important factor is the individual's loss considered separately, with
44.
45.
(1987).
46.
47.

See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
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the necessary result that the takings clause is more stringently enforced against state regulatory action.4 a
While the Court's decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church represents a substantial retraction from the position of Keystone Bituminous Coal Association, it is important to
recognize what the later decision did not do. The Court expressly
declined to decide whether the specific ordinance which the Court
considered effected an impermissible taking or whether the ordinance was justifiable as an exercise of the state's authority to enact
49
safety regulations.
The most recent Supreme Court takings clause decision is Nollan v. CaliforniqCoastal Commission." The Court in Nollan withdrew from the premise implicit in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association that public purposes declared by legislation to justify
property infringements would be afforded judicial deference." The
Court instead imposed a heightened scrutiny upon the regulation
at issue because it impacted what the Court deemed to be constitutionally protected property. 2
48. Id. at 2387-88. Perhaps tellingly, while courts and commentators commonly refer to
the relevant portion of the fifth amendment as the "takings" clause, Chief Justice Rehnquist refers to it as the "just compensation clause." Id. at 2387.
49. Id. at 2384. Chief Justice Rehnquist's anomalous reliance on both Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon and Mugler v. Kansas returns the Court squarely to the contradictory and
irreconcilable analysis which Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n should have eliminated.
Under this catchall method, a valid regulation is unassailable since the government may
prevent individuals from inflicting harm on the public, yet any regulation which forces the
individual to confer a public benefit goes "too far" and requires compensation. This distinction is without a difference and fails miserably as a standard. Without a workable analytical
standard, the courts are reduced to an ad hoc decisional practice imbued with barely the
legitimacy of the proverbial coin toss.
50. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
51. Id. The first portion of the opinion also dealt a blow to the expanded property concept and narrowed the scope of the "property" examination from the total rights retained
by the owner to the interests burdened by the property infringement. See id. at 3144.
52. Id. at 3149-50. The regulation created an easement along a California beach as the
condition to beachfront development. The California Coastal Commission found that the
easement would limit the burden placed on public beach access by reducing the barrier
created by beach development. Id. at 3141. The Court found that the easement's purpose
was facilitated only by its visual impact. Since the commission also found that the development completely blocked the public view of the beach, the Court found that the easement
could have no effect on the visual impact. Justice Brennan's dissent illustrates the narrowness of the Court's view of the regulation, both in its impact on visual access and its whole
purpose. Id. at 3154 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan found that the majority ignored the easement's visual impact upon the immediately adjacent public beach and its
primary purpose of diminishing the burden of private development upon public use of tidelands. Thus, the Court's implementation of its freshly created takings clause scrutiny is
both surgical and microscopic.
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The Court's analysis of the regulation in Nollan is particularly
difficult since it found that a proper implementation of the Commission's power would not result in an impermissible taking. 3 The
Court did not find that the effect of the regulation considered
alone demanded compensation. The Court only found that because
the regulation did not "substantially advance" the state's interest,
the infringement upon the owner's interest was impermissible.5
Nollan plunges the Court into a standardless, yet potent, posture against the exercise of the police power.5 5 While the holding of
Nollan is clearly hostile to government police power regulation, little is offered to direct the courts toward the identification of invalid exercises of that authority.5 6 The Court's decision introduces a
powerful new judicial authority against legislative regulation with
little indication of how regulatory bodies may avoid its scope. 7
The conclusion to be drawn from the Court's recent paradoxical
decisions comes from an evaluation of their underlying doctrines.
The cases of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon and Mugler v. Kansas are not reconcilable. 8 The Court's refusal to acknowledge this
conflict will inescapably lead to standardless judicial activism.5"
53. Id. at 3147.
54. Id. at 3150.
55. Justice Scalia implies that the taking of an easement might always require compensation, yet the conditioning of a necessary permit upon the grant of that easement is somehow less offensive to the takings clause if a state purpose is furthered by the taking of the
easement. Id. at 3145-46. See also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 106 S.
Ct. 455, 459 n.4 (1985). Thus, Justice Scalia adds his own chapter to the apparently endless
line of contradictory holdings under the takings clause.
56. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146-47 ("Our cases have not elaborated on the standards for
determining what constitutes a 'legitimate state interest' or what type of connection between the regulation and the state interest satisfies the requirement that the former 'substantially advance' the latter.").
57. The standardless nature of the Court's takings decisions allows the judiciary to craft
an individual standard for each case. This unbridled substitution of judicial judgment for
that of the political branches is reminiscent of another famous Holmes opinion. See Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905)(Holmes, J., dissenting).
58. See, e.g., Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 1068.
59. Property law is grounded in the individual's justifiable reliance upon the state's protection of expectations with respect to belongings. See Michelman, supra note 3, at 1235.
Unless government acknowledges that property interests, founded on the individual's expectations, require this predictability, the motivation of individuals is depressed, thus limiting
the efficacy of the economic system. Id. at 1211-12. Justice Holmes recognized this proposition: "When this seemingly absolute protection is found to be qualified by the police power,
the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification more and more until at
last private property disappears." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922). But property derives from the state's protective authority. The state, enacting valid
regulations, merely serves to further protect the expectations of its citizens. A law which
rationally relates to a legitimate government purpose cannot infringe upon legitimate expec-
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State v. Mid-Florida Growers

The unique factual setting of State v. Mid-Florida Growers"0
presents important takings clause considerations. The state's deprivation of the appellees' property rights requires due process analysis of both the validity of the state's purpose and the relationship
between the deprivation and that purpose. This evaluation entails
special prominence since Nollan" requires heightened scrutiny
where an exercise of the police power infringes on substantial
property rights.6 2 In addition, further analysis must be performed
on the court's conclusion in Mid-Florida Growers that compensation may still be necessary even though a deprivation substantially
advanced a legitimate government interest.6 3
A. Does the State's Interest in the Eradication of Citrus
Canker Justify the Destruction of "Healthy But Suspect"
Citrus Plants?
The purpose of the destruction of the appellees' citrus plants
was to prevent the spread of citrus canker."' However, the trial
court found that, despite the budwood's exposure to other infected
citrus, no evidence supported the state's assertion of the menace
presented by the exposed budwood. 65 The trial court held that because the state could not prove the disease was present in the suspect budwood destroyed, the destruction was not justified and required compensation.6 6
tations. Because those who enact police power regulations are of the political branches, it
must be assumed that the individual citizens have embodied their expectations in them.
The Court, by imposing a standardless application of the takings clause, disrupts the justifiable expectations of individuals in the valid protections afforded by police power regulation.
Property is thus threatened more by the absence of the police power than by its
enforcement.
60. 505 So. 2d 592 (1987).
61. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
62. Analysis of the extent of the deprivation in Mid-Florida Growers is unnecessary
since the deprivation is total. If the exercise of the police power was unwarranted in this
case, no remedy other than compensation is adequate.
63. Mid-Florida Growers, 505 So. 2d at 594 ("A valid exercise of the police power does
not preclude an inverse condemnation suit.").
64. Id. at 595.
65. Id. at 593 ("The most that can be said for the Defendant is that the Plaintiffs' nursery stock was obtained from a single source where some form of citrus canker was detected."
(quoting the trial judge)).
66. Id. Two Florida district courts of appeal previously considered the destruction of
"suspect" plants and held that their destruction was a valid exercise of the police power.
Nordmann v. Florida Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 473 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 5th DCA
1985); Denney v. Conner, 462 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Neither court, however, de-
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The protection of valuable agricultural resources is a valid state
purpose which may justify the destruction of property which is
harmful to those resources. 7 That the citrus industry in Florida is
a vast agricultural resource is hardly open to debate.6 8 Thus, the
eradication of plant pests which represent a major threat to Florida's citrus industry could constitute a valid exercise of the police
power, even at the expense of individual property interests.
The Florida Supreme Court has previously considered takings
clause controversies involving the destruction of plants to prevent
the spread of disease.6 9 The court in Corneal v. State Plant Board
considered legislation that mandated the destruction of plants infected with "spreading decline. ' 70 The implementation of the legislation required the destruction of the trees infested with the disease and also those trees immediately adjacent to the "infested
zone." 71 The court held that the compulsory destruction of the
uninfested trees worked an impermissible taking of property which
required compensation.7 2
Several factors influenced the court in Corneal. Foremost, the
court found that the total destruction of property was "justified
only within the narrowest limits of actual necessity. ' 73 The court
determined that the healthy trees presented an insufficient threat
to justify their uncompensated destruction.7 ' Because the disease
spread slowly and did not completely destroy even the infested
trees' productive value, the court found the destruction of the adcided the compensation issue. The courts' characterization of the threat posed by "healthy
but suspect" plants in Denney is in marked contrast with that of the trial court in MidFlorida Growers: "[Elven though the plants appear healthy and at this time evidence no
sign of citrus canker, appellants' plants still present an imminent danger in the spread of
the disease since they have been exposed to infested or infected plants." Denney, 462 So. 2d
at 536.
67. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928). The Court in Miller held that a Virginia
statute which required the destruction of ornamental cedar trees was a valid exercise of the
police power and did not require compensation. The cedar trees harbored "an infectious
plant disease" which damaged Virginia's apple crop. The Court found that the high economic value of the apple industry warranted "a choice between the preservation of one class
of property and that of the other wherever both existed in dangerous proximity." Id. at 279.
68. The value of citrus production from 1980 through 1985 was $1,044,828,000. BUREAU
OF ECONOMIC & BUSINESS RESEARCH, 1986 FLORIDA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT.
69. State Plant Bd. v. Smith, 110 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1959); Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 95
So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1957).
70. Corneal, 95 So. 2d at 2.
71. Id. at 3.
72. Id. at 6-7.

73.

Id. at 4.

74.

The court upheld the uncompensated destruction of the infested trees. Id. at 5.
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jacent healthy trees unwarranted. 5 The court further noted that
there was a less intrusive method than the destruction of the
healthy trees which might effectively control the disease. 7 Thus,
despite the legislature's declaration of "the most serious emergency
. . . yet encountered because of spreading decline,"' ' 7 the court
found that "no real emergency exist[ed]. 7 8
Considering facts essentially identical to those in Mid-Florida
Growers, the court in Denney v. Conner79 distinguished Corneal.
The court in Denney declared that the emergency lacking in the
infestation of spreading decline was present in the threat posed by
citrus canker."0 The court held that the disease posed an immediate threat to the public health, safety, or welfare sufficient to justify the destruction of citrus trees exposed to canker. "[I]n cases of
obvious and immediate danger, the state, in the exercise of its police power, may summarily destroy private property in order to
protect the public."'"
Similarly, the court in Mid-Florida Growers found that the destruction of "healthy but suspect" trees was a valid exercise of the
police power.8 2 It determined that the virulence of the disease and
the value of the citrus industry warranted the destruction of all
possible carriers of citrus canker. "We understand the difficulties
in determining whether canker is present in healthy trees. Destruction of the healthy trees, however, assured the continued vitality of
Florida's most valuable citrus industry.""3
The Florida courts thus determined that citrus canker indeed
presented an emergency in its threat to the Florida citrus industry,
and that the disease's particular virulence and potential for rapid
75. Id. at 5. Spreading decline is caused by microscopic nematodes and travels at an
average rate of 36 feet per year. Id. at 2. "Even the affected trees cannot be said to be
completely worthless, since they continue to bear fruit and do not die." Id. at 5.
76. Id. at 5 (A "barrier" of uncultivated soil was found an effective method of controlling
spreading decline).
77. Id. at 3.
78. Id. at 5. See also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3150 (1987)
("We view the Fifth Amendment's property clause to be more than a pleading requirement,
and compliance with it to be more than an exercise in cleverness and imagination.").
79. Denney v. Conner, 462 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
80. Id. at 536. The court particularly emphasized the nature of the transmission of citrus
canker. Spreading decline advances only a few feet per year, while the spread of citrus canker may be much more rapid since it is transmitted by wind, rain, and human contact.
81. Id. In Nordmann v. Florida Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 473 So. 2d 278 (Fla.
5th DCA 1985), the court relied heavily upon Denney and reached an identical conclusion.
82. State v. Mid-Florida Growers, Inc., 505 So. 2d 592, 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) ("We join
our sister courts in holding that the state's order was a valid exercise of its police power.").
83. Id.
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transmission warranted the destruction of both infected and
"healthy but suspect" citrus plants. While this analysis appears
sound, some of its basic assumptions may be subject to criticism.
First, the court's characterization of the threat posed by citrus canker may be unfounded. Second, the court's attempts to distinguish
Corneal v. State Plant Board8" may ignore the true reasoning of
that case. Finally, the level of scrutiny applied to the regulation
may be too lenient.
The Florida courts' citrus canker decisions are all founded, implicitly and explicitly, on the premise that the widespread introduction of citrus canker in Florida would have devastating consequences for Florida's citrus industry. While acceptance of this
premise is certainly common, it is clearly not universal."5 One commentator has questioned whether citrus canker could survive in
Florida's climate.8 6 Further, the countries which are infested with
canker continue to profitably produce citrus and control the disease without extraordinary measures.8 "
The court's interpretation of Corneal v. State Plant Board88 relies on the differences between the diseases involved to distinguish
the cases.89 However, the court's main premise in Corneal was
more deeply founded on the total deprivation of property worked
by the destruction of healthy plants. "[Tihe absolute destruction
of property is an extreme exercise of the police power and is justified only within the narrowest limits of actual necessity."90 The
court in Corneal found that the harsh results of the regulation demanded a tight limitation on the police power. Thus, the holding
of Corneal emphasized more the constitutional protection afforded
property than the evaluation of the supposed emergency. Corneal
stands for the proposition that total property deprivations demand
rigorous scrutiny of their police power justifications. It was this
magnified inspection which determined that the spreading decline
emergency was no emergency at all.9 1
84.
85.

95 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1957).
E.g., Canker: Dread Disease Found in Florida Citrus Nurseries, THE CITRUS INDUSTRY, Oct. 1984, at 5, 53 ("Reference has been made in the media to citrus canker as a 'killer'
disease.").
86. Whiteside, Canker Threat: How Serious a Threat is Canker to Florida Citrus Production, THE CITRUS INDUSTRY, Nov. 1985, at 8, 10.
87. Id,
88. Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 95 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1957).
89. E.g., Denney v. Conner, 462 So. 2d 534, 536 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
90. Corneal, 95 So. 2d at 4.
91. Id. at 6.
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Finally, both of the preceding criticisms become especially important in the perspective provided by Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission.9 2 Within the mandate provided by Nollan,
the relationship between the public purpose and the deprivation is
subject to heightened due process scrutiny. Application of this
more rigorous standard and the possibility of overemphasis of the
virulence of citrus canker could establish more similarities between
the citrus canker situation and the Florida Supreme Court's evaluation of the spreading decline "emergency."
Whatever the doctrinal significance of Corneal, it is clear that
within that analysis "healthy but suspect" citrus plants constitute
valuable property. 93 There may also exist a less harsh method for
controlling the disease than the destruction of the suspect plants.",
While the mode of citrus canker transmission creates the potential
for a more rapid infestation, Florida's climate may prevent citrus
grove infestation entirely.9 5 Additionally, countries which currently
suffer under canker infestation continue to maintain valuable citrus production. 6 Thus, within the scrutiny mandated by Nollan,
the contribution of "healthy but suspect" citrus plants to an imminent danger or emergency sufficient to justify the destruction of an
individual interest seems less appropriate.
However, it is essential to recognize what the result of this demanding scrutiny would require at the most basic level of analysis.
The courts, by invalidating this regulation, would mandate that
Florida's citrus industry expose itself to a detrimental plant disease. While this may be warranted by the peculiar facts of an individual case, the courts hardly seem equipped to determine the
long-term effects of this potentially momentous decision."' Thus,
the dilemma presented by the citrus canker problem shows what
danger lurks when courts substitute their judgment for that of the
legislature to determine the proper method of protecting property,
welfare, health, and safety.
92. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
93. Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 95 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1957).
94. See Whiteside, supra note 91, at 8 ("[I]t is now known that, with appropriate spray
timing, canker is controllable with copper sprays."). See also Corneal, 95 So. 2d at 5 (barrier
of uncultivated land provides protection from spreading decline).
95. Whiteside, supra note 91.
96. Id. at 10, 12. The Argentine example is most closely analogous although that climate
appears more conducive to citrus canker infestation. Id.
97. The eradication effort in Florida has already resulted in the destruction of at least
eight million young trees, many in voluntary efforts at eradication. Hardy, Citrus Canker:
An InternationalPerspective, THE CITRUS INDUSTRY, June 1985, at 5, 9.
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Mid-FloridaGrowers also demonstrates the paradox of "protecting property" by invalidating police power regulations. The general
expectation of the citrus industry is that the disease must be eradicated to prevent its long-term consequences. 8 The state enforced
eradication of canker is a valid protection of the core property interest in citrus production. The court's substitution of its own
judgment would disrupt the most basic property protection afforded by the government's police power. 9
B.

Can a Valid Exercise of the Police Power Result in a
Taking Requiring Compensation?

The court in Mid-Florida Growers' 0 determined that a "valid
exercise of the police power does not preclude an inverse condemnation suit."'"' The court relied on a Florida Supreme Court case,
0 in reaching this conclusion. "It
Albrecht v. State,'1
is a settled
proposition that a regulation or statute may meet the standards
necessary for exercise of the police power but still result in a taking."10 3 However, an analysis of Albrecht indicates that this premise may be inapplicable to Mid-Florida Growers. Furthermore,
an analysis of the Florida Supreme Court's takings cases may indicate that the proposition is not supported.
The dispute in Albrecht v. State concerned an application for a
permit to fill submerged land.'0 4 The plaintiff in Albrecht brought
suit when the permit was denied. The court did not decide the taking issue, nor did it consider whether the permit process was a
valid exercise of the police power. The holding of Albrecht was
that judicial review of a takings issue is separate from administrative review of the validity of the permitting process for the purpose
of the doctrine of res judicata.'10 The passage quoted in Mid-Florida Growers' " was merely dicta illustrating the separate issues involved in administrative and judicial review.
98.

E.g., Hardy, Research into Canker Eradicationand Control Continues, THE CrrRus
Mar. 1985, at 50.
What result would be reached under due process analysis if the regulation were elimby the courts and the citrus industry was eventually wiped out by citrus canker?
State v. Mid-Florida Growers, Inc., 505 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
Id.
444 So. 2d 8, 12 (Fla. 1984).
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.

INDUSTRY,

99.
inated
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
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The court in Albrecht cited Graham v. Estuary Properties,
Inc.10 7 for the proposition that the valid exercise of the police
power could still result in a taking. 10 8 Yet that reliance seems unfounded. The court in Estuary Propertiesfound no taking, and its
reasoning supports the opposite conclusion. "We simply reaffirm
the rule that exercise of the state's police power must relate to the
health, safety, and welfare of the public and may not be arbitrarily
and capriciously applied."' 0 9
The courts in Estuary Propertiesand Albrecht v. State relied on
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon'" in holding that even a valid
exercise of the police power could result in a taking. However, only
the court in Estuary Properties provided an extensive discussion
of the principle, and there the court distinguished Mahon."' The
court found that the allegations of regulation forcing the property
owner to confer a benefit were unpersuasive where a substantial
public harm was prevented." 2
[T]he line between the prevention of a public harm and the creation of a public benefit is not often clear. It is a necessary result
that the public benefits whenever a harm is prevented. However,
it does not necessarily follow that the public is safe from harm
when a benefit is created.11 3
Thus, even in a regulatory setting and without an allegation of
an immediate public danger or emergency, the Florida Supreme
Court acknowledged the deference owed the government in its exercise of the police power. Thus, the court's reliance in Mid-Florida Growers on Albrecht is at most reliance upon dictum twice
removed.
The parallel between the reasoning of Estuary Properties and
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association is obvious. Both cases were
basically decided on principles originally enunciated in Mugler v.
4
Kansas.1
107. 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981).
108. Albrecht, 444 So. 2d at 12.
109. Estrary Properties,399 So. 2d at 1379.
110. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
111. Estuary Properties, 399 So. 2d at 1381.
112. Id. at 1382. The court in Estuary Properties upheld a regulation which reduced a
development by half to prevent an adverse environmental impact. Id.
113. Id.
114. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
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[[P]roperty rights] are best secured, in our government, by the
observance, upon the part of all, of such regulations as are established by competent authority to promote the common good. No
one may rightfully do that which the law-making power, upon
reasonable grounds, declares to be prejudicial to the general
welfare."'
This analysis" 6 is valid despite the United States Supreme
Court's decisions after Keystone Bituminous Coal Association.
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission" 7 dealt exclusively with
land use regulation unrelated to the public safety justification.'" 8
The Court in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles" 9 expressly withheld a decision on what
constitutes a taking and decided only the issue of whether a temporary taking demands compensation."10 Thus, the example of
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association controls. The decision of
the legislature to remove a serious threat to the public should not
be hampered by the requirement of compensation.
III.

CONCLUSION

Despite the contradictions which hamper the resolution of takings clause controversies, the courts may still craft sound decisions.
The protection of private property requires a broad judicial vision
to recognize those exercises of the state's power which, though they
may work individual injury, protect justifiable expectations. The
valid exercise of police power authority protects private property.
The dilemma of takings decisions is created by competing judicial doctrines which simultaneously require activism and restraint.
This contradiction is evident throughout the decisions on the tak115.

Id. at 663. The review reserved for Mugler by the judiciary is similarly deferential:
If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public
health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation
to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental
law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the
Constitution.
Id. at 661.
116. See also text accompanying note 63.
117. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
118. Id. at 3149.
119. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
120. Id. at 2377-78.

586

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:569

ings clause, 2 1 and it continues to work a detriment to valid expectations by introducing an unfettered judiciary into the balance
struck by police power regulations.
Police power regulations which respond to an imminent public
threat or emergency demand particular judicial deference. 122 This
deference is especially important where the result of the regulation's invalidation is potentially devastating and unforeseeable.
The Florida Supreme Court should weigh these factors with extreme care. The examples of Keystone Bituminous Coal Association and Mugler v. Kansas should control the outcome of MidFlorida Growers. The Florida Supreme Court should uphold the
destruction of "healthy but suspect" citrus trees without
compensation.
Jonathan Sjostrom

121. Compare First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107
S. Ct. 2378 (1987) with Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (1952); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S.
272 (1928); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).

